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Exploring the Narratives and Norms of ʻNewʼ Surrogacy in 
Australia 
Jenni Millbank* 
This article explores the role of discourse and narrative in 
shaping the recent wave of reforms to surrogacy law and policy 
around Australia. I examine two sites of dialogue – 
parliamentary debate and media representations – where 
discourses concerning surrogacy have been reframed 
dramatically to justify a new era of regulation. The themes that 
have emerged through these reform dialogues both reflect and 
recraft contemporary understandings of surrogacy specifically, 
and non-traditional family formation more broadly. As such, this 
is both an analysis of the role of evolving discourses of 
surrogacy, infertility and assisted reproductive technology in 
Australia, and a case study of a multiple-jurisdiction law reform 
process dominated by narrative and anecdote. 
I cannot think of a more worthy thing for this Parliament to do than to 
say to those people … ‘We will change the law to enable you to take 
advantage of technology which is readily available … and we will 
utilise the law to enable you to become the legal parent of the child 
born as the result of that process’. As a matter of public policy, we do 
not support commercial surrogacy … That is not something that is 
part of the Australian culture, if one likes … This legislation is based 
upon altruistic surrogacy … in other words, the couple need … to 
have a sister or a best friend who is prepared to carry the child for the 
couple. What a noble thing to do from an altruistic base! I find it hard 
to comprehend those people who do not support such a good, 
wholesome proposition to create human life and to bring that human 
life into a family that is so desperately keen to extend its love.1 
– Jim McGinty, Shadow Attorney General, Western Australia, 2008 
We have all read, particularly in women’s magazines, about a sister 
having children for her sister and, sometimes, a mother having 
children for her daughter.2 
– Linda Burney, NSW Minister for Community Services, 2010 
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1  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, p 770. 
2  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 October 2010, 27120.  
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Recent years have seen a transformation of surrogacy laws across Australia. 
Wide-ranging direct and indirect prohibitions on surrogacy in all states and 
territories, bar the Northern Territory, have been repealed and replaced with 
a new regime of detailed regulation. These reforms introduced state-based 
parentage transfer processes that grant legal recognition to intended parent–
child relationships and amended assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
laws, in those states which have them, in order to allow eligibility for IVF in 
surrogacy in limited circumstances.3 
The gulf traversed by these reforms is most acutely evidenced in the 
state of Queensland, which in the space of just over 20 years introduced and 
abandoned the harshest regime criminalising all forms of surrogacy. In 1988, 
the Queensland Minister for Community Services introduced the original 
legislation thus: 
[I]t is the strong belief of members of the Queensland Government 
that to use or to pay another human being to reproduce is the ultimate 
in dehumanisation. We are of the opinion that a baby must not be 
treated as a commodity …4 
In 2008, Queensland Premier Anna Bligh prefaced reforms by saying: 
The reality is that for some people surrogacy is their only hope of 
starting a family. I believe and the government believes it is grossly 
unfair that their genuine efforts to do so could land them behind bars.5 
Thus surrogacy has been transformed from an abhorrent commodification of 
children to a legitimate family formation avenue – albeit one of last resort. 
This article interrogates the role of discourse and narrative in shaping 
the recent wave of reforms to surrogacy law and policy around Australia.6 I 
argue that the themes that have emerged through these reform dialogues 
arise from and contribute to the reshaping of contemporary understandings 
of surrogacy specifically, and of non-traditional family formation more 
broadly. I examine two sites of dialogue – parliamentary debate7 and media 
                                                           
3  For a detailed critique of the substantive provisions, see Millbank (2011). For reasons of 
space, this article does not reproduce the legislative provisions. Tasmania’s reforms 
remain stalled in the upper house at the time of writing (August 2012). 
4  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 23 March 1988, 5546 (PR McKechnie). 
5  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 23 April 2009, p 147 (Anna Bligh). The Queensland 
Attorney-General stated that the reforms would ‘assist people to realise their dreams of 
having a family’: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 26 November 2009, p 3667 
(Cameron Dick). 
6  Discourse is used in the sense proposed by Norman Fairclough – as a mode of action or 
social practice, as well as a mode of representation (Fairclough 1992). 
7  This article focuses upon parliamentary debates from Western Australia, New South 
Wales, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania because the legislative reforms in those 
states were specific to surrogacy, whereas in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and 
Victoria, surrogacy provisions were a small part of far broader reforms (to legal parentage 
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representations – where discourses around surrogacy have been dramatically 
reframed to justify a new era of regulation. As such, this is an analysis both 
of evolving discourses of surrogacy, infertility and ART in Australia, and a 
case study of a multiple-jurisdiction law reform process dominated by 
narrative and anecdote.8 Notably absent from the parliamentary debates was 
the substantial, and developing, body of empirical research on surrogacy 
families.9 In fact there were only four references to scholarly research on 
surrogacy: three in the exhaustive three-year Western Australian debates and 
a single mention in the New South Wales debates.	  10  
All the legislative debates took place following, or in conjunction with, 
short-term public inquiries. It is notable that these inquiries, taken together, 
heard from only a handful of people who had actually gone through 
surrogacy or were contemplating surrogacy as intended parents, and even 
fewer women who had been birth mothers. At the same time, several dozen 
Australian individuals and couples who had either engaged in surrogacy to 
form their family, or planned to do so in the future, participated in print and 
electronic media stories about surrogacy.11 Whether categorised as news, 
                                                                                                                              
and assisted reproduction, respectively), and there was less focus on issues concerning 
surrogacy. 
8  Arguably, this is more common than not in Australian law reform concerning family 
issues: see Graycar (2000, 2012); Rhoades (2010). 
9  For overviews, see: van den Akker (2007); Ciccarelli and Beckman (2005). While 
opponents of reforms regularly claimed that ‘all the research’ supported their position, this 
‘evidence’ concerned purported harms of same-sex parenting and donor conception, not 
surrogacy (and was copied wholesale from submissions of Christian think-tanks, in 
particular the Australian Family Association, with no attribution to any researcher or 
research institution). 
10  There were two brief references to anthropological and sociological research on the 
experience of birth mothers and intended parents, in the United States and United 
Kingdom respectively: Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
14 November 2007, p 7059 (Robyn McSweeny, referring to Heléna Ragoné’s work) and 
Legislative Assembly, 10 May 2007, p 2114 (Jim McGinty, referring to Olga van den 
Akker’s work). There were two more detailed references to newer psychological research 
in the United Kingdom by Susan Golombok, Fiona McCallum and their team on the 
development and well-being of children born through surrogacy: Western Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 December 2008, pp 907, 908 (Kim 
Hames, referring to a summary of research published as a background paper by the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
27 October 2010, p 26917 (David Shoebridge). See Golombok et al (2006). 
11  The media survey was drawn from Australian media databases FACTIVA and 
INFORMIT using the search words ‘surrogacy’ and ‘surrogate’, covering the period 
January 2007 to December 2010. Of these, in 45 cases at least one person (usually an 
intended parent, less commonly a birth mother) was identified by full name; in fifteen 
there was identification by first names only; and in nine all adult parties were unnamed (of 
those nine reports, either the child’s first name was given or the salient facts differed such 
that it was clear that they were distinct arrangements). Follow-up searches were made 
using participant names as search terms in the above databases and across the internet 
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legal, health, current affairs or ‘lifestyle’ articles, these reports comprised 
narratives of what surrogacy had meant for the participants personally – why 
they came to surrogacy, how they did it, their joy and fulfilment at the 
children who resulted; less commonly, their heartbreak if they were as yet 
unsuccessful. It is notable that most stories contained explicit or implicit 
comment on the need for, or scope of, proposed law reforms. Families 
presented their own circumstances as a case study in a manner directed 
towards changing social and legal barriers to surrogacy, although the great 
majority of them did not participate in the parliamentary inquiries. 
Numerous newspaper editorials were published through this period in 
tandem with the stories, all of which were supportive of surrogacy and 
promoted liberalisation of surrogacy law.12 I argue that these media 
representations demonstrably motivated and informed legislative reforms, 
although not always in a straightforward manner.13 
Prior to the flurry of media attention that accompanied this wave of 
reforms, two high-profile arrangements, in 1988 and 1998 respectively, set a 
powerful template influencing the development of Australian discourses 
around surrogacy. These were the birth of Alice Kirkman and the lengthily 
disputed arrangement in the Re Evelyn litigation.14 More latterly, the birth in 
2006 of daughter Isabella to federal Senator Stephen Conroy was the focus 
of enormous media attention and a frequently cited trigger for reform. The 
three girls born through these diverse surrogacy arrangements merit specific 
attention because of the way in which their individual circumstances have 
moulded the parameters of debate. Along with a handful of other children 
who had appeared in the media, Alice, Evelyn and Isabella were referenced 
in the parliamentary debates throughout Australia as evidence of both the 
need for and the outcomes of surrogacy.15  
                                                                                                                              
using Google. Many participants appeared in a single press report, while others appeared 
across print, radio and television, or appeared in follow-up articles over a period of time. 
12  See, for example, ‘Update Sterile Laws’, Herald Sun, 3 August 2008, p 31; Riley (2008), 
p 21; ‘Rights of the Child Get Legal Backing’, Geelong Advertiser, 8 December 2008, 
p 21; Walker (2009), p 3.  
13  In particular, intended parents in the media commentary did not propose or promote 
restrictive legislative models, such as those limiting access to surrogacy on the basis of 
marital status or genetic connection, discussed below. On the contrary, a number of media 
participants spoke of the importance of not imposing general rules from their own 
experience, and indeed some openly advocated non discriminatory access: see, for 
example, Dibben (2008), p 28; AAP (2010). See also the testimony of Maggie, Linda and 
Alice Kirkman to this effect at the Queensland inquiry: Queensland Parliament (2008), 
pp 13, 17, 18. Testimony from intended parents to the South Australia Inquiry was more 
mixed: two intended mothers opposed restriction of access to heterosexual married 
couples, one father supported it and another intended mother was more equivocal: 
Parliament of South Australia (2007), 30 April 2007, pp 161–62; 4 June 2007, pp 165–66. 
14  Re Evelyn (1998) 23 Fam LR 53; JRN & Anor v IEG [1998] HCATrans 263 (3 August 
1998); JRN & Anor v IEG [1998] HCATrans 327 (11 September 1998). 
15  On Alice see: South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 21 November 
2007, p 1767 (PL White); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 159 
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Parliamentary debates were replete with references to surrogacy stories 
from the press. Such representations were not limited to papers of record, 
and included express mention of television current affairs programs and 
populist ‘women’s magazines’ such as Woman’s Day.16 There were also 
numerous references to common sense, common knowledge, emotion, heart 
and instinct by members articulating the basis of their position.17 Indeed one 
MP evidenced the importance of genetic identity and the issue of 
‘genealogical bewilderment’ through reading into the parliamentary record 
the entirety of one of her children’s favourite books, ‘Are You my 
Mother?’18 In this light, it is a fair inference that members of parliament were 
informed about surrogacy to a considerable degree through media 
representations and popular or ‘folk’ understandings, rather than research 
findings.  
Prominent discursive themes in both parliamentary and media accounts 
included: surrogacy as a ‘cure’ for infertility; surrogacy as a form of special 
relationship between family and friends; and genetics as determinative of the 
‘real’ or ‘biological’ parents of children. Undergirding these debates is the 
paradoxical and shifting relation of surrogacy to the ‘natural’ in terms of 
reproduction methods, parenting practices and parental desire.19 
Interestingly, none of the participants in the reform dialogues across both 
sites – whether speaking for or against the various reform measures – 
disputed the idea that parenting was, and ought to be, natural. Rather, they 
sought to realign experiences of, and perspectives on, surrogacy to accord 
with shifting claims of naturalness. Genetics, heterosexuality, the desire to 
parent, the importance of parental love and the march of medicine were all 
variously framed within a trope of ‘the natural’ to support and to oppose the 
reforms.  
                                                                                                                              
(Rosemary Menkens) and 11 February 2010, p 251 (Evan Moorehead). On Evelyn, see 
note 32. On Isabella, see Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 14 February 2008, p 24 
(Anna Bligh); see also Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 5 April 
2011, p 70 (Elise Archer) and 12 April 2011, p 60 (Rebecca White). See also Western 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 May 2007, p 1772 (Kim 
Hames), referring to the Banfield twins and Pippy Rushford: see note 152. 
16  See, for example, Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
8 May 2007, p 1764 (Kim Hames); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
27 October 2010, p 26922 (Greg Donnelly); Linda Burney, n 2 at 2; Western Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, p 782 (Alannah 
MacTiernan). 
17  See, for example, Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
3 December 2008, p 907 (Alannah MacTiernan and Martin Whitely).  
18  By PD Eastman (1960). Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
13 November 2007, pp 6918–20 and again on 13 November 2008, p 249 (Barbara Scott). 
19  On surrogacy and the ‘unnatural’, see ‘Introduction’ in Cook et al (2003), pp 5–6. 
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Youʼve Come a Long Way, Surrogacy Babies 
As far back as 1990, the National Bioethics Consultative Committee 
(NBCC) noted that surrogacy had received disproportionate attention in 
Australia, given its infrequent occurrence, and suggested that the powerful 
symbolism of the mother–child bond lay at the base of this intensity. Indeed, 
the NBCC characterised the first wave of Australian reforms as an ‘over-
hasty and ill-considered reaction’ to a few highly publicised international 
commercial surrogacy cases in the early to mid-1980s, including ‘Baby 
Cotton’ in the United Kingdom and ‘Baby M’ in the United States.20 In 1988, 
Australian sisters Maggie and Linda Kirkman presented a powerful counter-
narrative of domestic altruistic surrogacy.21  
The Kirkmans’ arrangement involved a gestational surrogacy: Alice 
was conceived through IVF involving Maggie’s egg and donor sperm, and 
carried by Linda. The Kirkman sisters wrote a book, regularly engaged in 
media comment and public debate on surrogacy, and contributed formal 
submissions as well as oral testimony to numerous law reform inquiries on 
ART-related issues from that time forward.22 In doing so, they consistently 
presented the perspective of both intended mother and birth mother in joint 
and individual narratives that stressed honesty, communication and familial 
closeness.23 The prominence of the Kirkmans in shaping Australian public 
discourse on surrogacy should not be under-estimated: as well as regular 
quotes from both sisters upon various surrogacy reform proposals, sustained 
media coverage of Alice through her childhood caused her to later remark: 
‘When I was little I thought everyone got on TV for their birthdays.’24 Alice 
herself made public statements about surrogacy while still a child, including 
a presentation to an international conference on assisted reproduction at the 
age of 1125 and a number of publications about her experience and views.26 
As an adult, Alice participated in the Victorian and Queensland reform 
inquiries and lobbied for the passage of Victorian laws granting broader 
access to ART as well as surrogacy.27  
                                                           
20  National Bioethics Consultative Committee (1990a), para 2.5.2. See also National 
Bioethics Consultative Committee (1990b); Stuhmcke (2004). 
21  See Pitt (1988). 
22  See Kirkman and Kirkman (1988). The NBCC Report (1990a) lists separate submissions 
from Linda, Maggie and Sev Clarke, Alice’s non-biological father (p 99). Maggie, Linda 
and Alice appeared jointly as witnesses at the Queensland Surrogacy Inquiry, and Maggie 
and Alice attended two consultation roundtables as part of the Victorian ART Inquiry.  
23  See, for example, McCarthy (1993), p 2: ‘according to Maggie and Linda Kirkman, the 
experience has only tightened bonds that were already strong’; Kirkman (1993): ‘gestating 
my sister’s child has enhanced, not threatened, family relationships’. 
24  Brown (2008). 
25  Taylor (1999). 
26  Kirkman and Kirkman (2002). See also Kirkman (1995, 2005). 
27  See Barry (2008). 
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The Kirkmans became an influential example of a positive experience 
of surrogacy that was altruistic, intra-familial and gestational – all elements 
that came to be prioritised in the reforms.28 They also established a strong 
tradition of narrative focus on women in press coverage of surrogacy – 
indeed, one article referred to it being ten years since Linda and Maggie 
Kirkman had gone public with ‘their pregnancy’.29 Sev Clarke, Maggie’s 
husband and Alice’s non-biological father, although frequently mentioned 
by the women, was never a focus of, and rarely a participant in, the stories. 
Alice’s tenth birthday coincided with the release a week earlier of the 
decision of Full Court of the Family Court of Australia concerning the first 
(and to date only) contested surrogacy case in Australia, Re Evelyn, giving 
rise to direct comparisons between the two situations. Re Evelyn involved 
two couples who had been long-term friends (named the Qs and the Ss in the 
judgments), who entered into a surrogacy arrangement that did not involve 
IVF, using the sperm of the intended father (Mr Q) and the egg of the birth 
mother (Mrs S). This form of arrangement has variously been called 
‘genetic’, ‘traditional’ or ‘partial’ surrogacy, in which the birth mother is 
also a genetic mother to the child. Evelyn was initially raised by the Qs but 
Mrs S sought the return of the child when she was seven months old. The 
trial judgment, undisturbed on appeal, was that it was in Evelyn’s best 
interests to be returned to and raised by the Ss and have monthly contact 
with the Qs. At the conclusion of the litigation, the birth mother called for all 
forms of surrogacy to be banned in Australia.30 The case was extensively 
covered in the print media31 and has cast a long shadow: more than a decade 
later, it continues to be cited in the press and parliamentary debates as an 
example of the inherent dangers of surrogacy.32  
                                                           
28  This is not to suggest that the Kirkmans actually supported aspects of the debated Bills or 
ultimate legislation that prescribed restrictions or exclusions concerning these issues. 
Maggie Kirkman posits that the meaning of genetic connection is deeply individual, such 
that no general approach can be taken regarding gestational versus genetic surrogacy. She 
has also repeatedly expressed the view that intra-familial surrogacy should not be seen as 
‘ideal’ because of the prospect of emotional pressure within families: see, for example, 
Queensland Parliament (2008), pp 13–14. While Linda Kirkman made some statements 
opposing commercial surrogacy (Kirkman 1993, p 17), Maggie’s remarks focus much 
more on the importance of knowing the birth mother in order to maintain connection, 
rather than opposing commercial payment per se: see McCarthy (1993), p 2; Thomas and 
Sutton (1997), p 1; Queensland Parliament (2008), p 14. 
29  Dixon and Freeman (1998). 
30  Ruben (1998). 
31  Of over 80 articles see, for example, Fitzpatrick (1998). 
32  See, for example, Adam (2002); Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 13 November 2008, p 261 (Brian Ellis); Legislative Assembly, 2 December 
2008, p 749 (Peter Abetz); South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
27 September 2006, p 762 (Andrew Evans); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
10 February 2010, p 159 (Rosemary Menkens); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly 28 October 2010, p 27124 (Greg Smith). 
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Through these two cases, a powerful narrative contrast was developed 
between the ‘good’ surrogacy of the Kirkmans and the surrogacy-gone-
wrong of Evelyn.33 Some coverage explicitly contended that the Kirkmans 
were successful because the surrogacy was gestational34 – such that the 
intended mother Maggie was the ‘true’ mother. In contrast, Evelyn involved 
genetic surrogacy such that it was the surrogate mother, Mrs S, who was the 
‘natural mother’ (also ‘biological mother’), and her difficulty in 
relinquishing the child was therefore seen as inevitable.35 Some articles 
referred to the genetic surrogacy in Evelyn as ‘illegitimate surrogacy’ and 
not ‘true surrogacy’.36 A major discursive trend was established: genetic 
surrogacy as dangerous and unnatural; gestational surrogacy as safe (or 
safer), and intra-familial surrogacy as ideal.  
In 2006, a federal senator announced the birth of his child, Isabella, 
through gestational surrogacy. Stephen Conroy and his partner, Paula 
Benson, had a daughter with the assistance of two women, one of whom was 
the birth mother and the other an egg donor. Although Senator Conroy made 
this statement via a media release, while Ms Benson and the two unnamed 
women involved made no public statements at all, the case appeared in 
nearly 200 print media reports alone in Australia.37 Conroy later appeared in 
a number of television and radio interviews discussing surrogacy law 
reform, and gave personal testimony to the 2008 Tasmanian surrogacy 
inquiry in a public hearing in which media were present. At that time he 
characterised the press coverage as ‘95 per cent … overwhelmingly 
positive’.38 
Interestingly, in media coverage of Conroy the egg donor and surrogate 
were commonly characterised as ‘family friends’, a designation bridging the 
intra-familial arrangement of the Kirkmans and the (former) friendship of 
the Qs and Ss. (In 2008, Conroy acknowledged that both women were 
Isabella’s godmothers, another quasi-familial designation.39) The 
involvement of a donor egg both reinforced and contradicted the evolving 
discourse of the importance of genetics in surrogacy. The common wisdom 
arising since Evelyn, that gestational surrogacy is ‘safer’ and less likely to 
give rise to disputes and issues of relinquishment than genetic surrogacy, 
was reflected in Conroy’s statements that this was a motivation for utilising 
a donor egg40 as well as a quote from an IVF specialist that genetic surrogacy 
                                                           
33  See, for example, Horin (1998); Fynes-Clinton (1998). 
34  See also Bone (1993): ‘the fact that Alice was not her natural daughter … made all the 
difference to Linda Kirkman’s ability to hand the child to Maggie … this is a crucial 
difference …’ 
35  See, for example, Egan (1998). 
36  Fynes-Clinton (1998); see also Lamperd (1998) 
37  See, for example, Murphy (2006); Dunlevy (2006).  
38  Tasmania, Legislative Council, Select Committee on Surrogacy, 1 July 2008, Senator 
Conroy, Testimony, p 3. 
39  Senator Conroy, n 47, p 4. 
40  See Coorey (2005); Senator Conroy, n 47, p 5. 
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‘had often resulted in the surrogate mother later making a claim as the 
baby’s legal mother’.41 Numerous reports referred to both egg donor and 
surrogate as ‘surrogates’, or to the arrangement as ‘double surrogacy’, and 
suggested that this was highly novel, or an Australian ‘first’. In fact, as we 
will see, the use of donor eggs appears to be a relatively common aspect of 
contemporary surrogacy, but one that confounds the prevailing trope of 
genetic connectedness as the axis of parentage.  
The other major theme that arose in the coverage of Isabella’s birth was 
the restrictive role of law and the prevalence of evasive travel within 
Australia. Conroy and Benson were excluded by law from accessing clinical 
assistance for surrogacy in their home state of Victoria, and thus undertook 
IVF treatment in New South Wales, where the child was subsequently born. 
Just as representations of the Kirkmans valorised intra-familial surrogacy 
and Evelyn symbolised the perils of genetic surrogacy, Isabella came to 
symbolise the oppressive role of law. Virtually every article stated that the 
couple had been ‘forced’ to travel because of Victorian law. Conroy 
advocated publicly as well as politically for the ‘harmonisation’ of 
Australian surrogacy laws, and was widely credited with being the catalyst 
for, as well as a force behind, the nationwide move to liberalisation.42 
Isabella is also a fascinating anomaly in the media accounts of surrogacy in 
that the coverage focused exclusively upon the male parent. In almost all 
other media accounts, it is the female intended parent – whether or not a 
genetic parent – who is the focus.  
ʻNewʼ Surrogacy 
The range of discussion offered in the parliamentary debates is unusually 
rich – in my view, owing to the extraordinary fact that all of them bar one 
involved a conscience vote on at least one side of parliament. Indeed, the 
majority involved a conscience vote on both sides of parliament.43 In all, 
there were over 200 speakers in the Australian parliamentary debates on 
                                                           
41  ‘Using Two Surrogate Mums May Prevent Later Court Battles’, AAP, 7 November 2006. 
42  See also ‘Govt Flags National Consistent Surrogacy Laws’, AAP, 10 November 2006; 
‘Conroy to Press Colleagues on Surrogacy Laws’, AAP, 4 December 2007; ‘States to Act 
over Surrogacy’, Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 9 April 2007.  
43  In News South Wales and Victoria, the Bills were moved by Labor governments; both 
government and opposition offered a conscience vote. In Western Australia, the Bill was 
drafted by a Labor government but after it lost office the Bill was moved in exactly the 
same form by a conservative Coalition government; both sides offered a conscience vote. 
In Queensland, the Bill was moved by a Labor government, which offered its members a 
conscience vote, while the opposition held a party vote against. (The opposition put its 
own Bill forward to which it offered its members a conscience vote, while the government 
had a party vote against). In South Australia, the original Bill was a Private Member’s Bill 
moved by John Dawkins, an opposition Liberal MP. After lapsing, the Bill was moved by 
the Shadow Minister for Health and later extensively amended in committee with the 
support of the Minister for Health. Both sides offered a conscience vote. Tasmania was 
alone in having a party vote on both sides (and stalled as a result of a majority of 
independent members in the Legislative Council).  
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surrogacy. In addition, in two states (South Australia and Western 
Australia), the debates were prolonged over a three-year period. In most of 
the jurisdictions under discussion, debate did not divide firmly along party 
lines, such that the views expressed about surrogacy in general, and the 
legislative proposals specifically, were largely individualised rather than 
party-based.  
Only a handful of voices opposing surrogacy as a practice per se were 
raised in either parliamentary debate or media representations.44 It is striking 
that only 20 years after surrogacy had been seen as a profound threat to 
Australian family life,45 virtually every Member of Parliament who spoke 
against the various Bills argued that they did not oppose surrogacy in 
principle, and would support a different version of surrogacy laws than the 
one on offer. Parliamentary discussion was characterised by a chorus of 
sympathy and support for those who need to resort to surrogacy, with 
opposition to the reforms focused on establishing the right kind of surrogacy. 
At the heart of this was contention over (1) access of same-sex couples and 
single people to surrogacy and (2) mandating genetic connection of the child 
to intended parents (and absence of such connection to the birth mother). 
Both of these controversies rested on a construction of the natural as 
absolutely requiring either (or both) heterosexual coupled parenting and 
genetic parenting – in a manner which trumped or perhaps renaturalised the 
presence of another woman as gestational parent. 
There were also some marked differences in the two sites of reform 
dialogue. Parliamentary debates uncritically perpetuated the stark 
dichotomisation of ‘altruistic’ and ‘commercial’ surrogacy, which has been a 
notable feature of Australian laws and policy to date, with members 
unanimous in their vigorous condemnation of ‘commercial’ surrogacy. In 
contrast, many of the families who participated in media had engaged in 
commercial surrogacy overseas and spoke positively of the benefits of 
payment. In my analysis, the press reports revealed a surprisingly nuanced 
approach to payment, which included some aspects of authorial tone that 
retained condemnation (‘womb for rent’) but also explored the role of 
payment in particular situations and allowed for a wider range of meanings 
around the roles in commercial surrogacy. This ‘unpacking’ of payment 
                                                           
44  See Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 193 (Andrew Powell), and 
pp 161–63 (Elizabeth Cunningham); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 10 November 2010, pp 27583–84 (John Aquilina). 
45  For example, the 1988 Report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
recommended that ‘surrogate motherhood should be discouraged by all practicable legal 
and social means’: New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1988), paras [4.6] and 
[4.7]. In 1991, the Minister for Community Services in Victoria made a public speech in 
which she likened surrogacy to slavery: Jacovac (1991). Organised feminist opposition to 
surrogacy based on the premise that the practice is inherently exploitative of women also 
appears to have dissipated: contrast the high-profile participation of FINRRGE (Feminist 
International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering) in the 
1999 West Australian parliamentary inquiry with the absence of any feminist opposition 
in the 2008 Queensland parliamentary inquiry. 
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appears to be a new development in Australian public discourses on 
surrogacy. The themes common to both sites are discussed below, followed 
by an exploration of the main area of divergence, money. 
Infertility and the Natural 
The parliamentary debates are quite startling for their personal and at times 
frankly revelatory tone, reflecting the focus on personal narratives of family 
formation present in the media accounts. Almost every MP, speaking for or 
against the measures, situated themselves as parents or grandparents at the 
commencement of their address. Many MPs also offered detailed narratives 
of formative incidents in their own family lives, including miscarriages, the 
premature delivery of babies, childhood accidents and mortality, time spent 
as a sole caregiver of children, the raising of adopted children and step-
children and their own experiences as children who were adopted, had an 
adopted sibling or were raised by a single parent. As one Tasmanian MP 
stated: 
I absolutely accept that every one of us has our own story as it relates 
to family, children, fertility matters and the rest of it. Each one of us 
has our own story that informs us.46  
These detailed personal narratives were openly utilised to establish authority 
in competing claims about what matters in childrearing based on experience 
and observation.  
The debates contain countless statements about the joys (and 
challenges) of childrearing, an experience posited as universal except 
inasmuch as it is denied to the infertile.47 The individual desire to parent was 
persistently naturalised in the debates, as was a collective drive for, and 
social interest in, reproduction: 
[I]t really is not our place to legislate against [IVF or surrogacy] 
because reproduction and survival of the race is a natural urge … 
If you want a child you want a child, and you will go to the ends of 
the earth to have one.48  
We cannot govern the wind, we cannot administer the tides and we 
should not try to control human reproduction.49  
                                                           
46  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly 5 April 2011, p 74 (Rene Hidding). 
47  For example: ‘Those of us with children and grandchildren will know what a delight and 
joy a healthy, happy child is … The Bill recognises that there is a human need within us 
all, I believe to have and to care for children.’ New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 28 October 2010, p 27125 (Barry Collier). 
48  South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 June 2008, pp 3377, 
3381 (Ann Bressington). 
49  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 188 (Dean Wells). 
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It was widely argued that parliament should not ‘stand in the way’ of the 
desire to have children, an argument made with whimsical poignancy in the 
following vignette: 
You’re saying that all these people shouldn’t have children. You’ve 
had children and have grandchildren; you know what it’s like … 
What you’re saying is that you don’t want these other people to have 
that blessing. That’s just something I can’t understand. 
There is nothing more precious to a parent, or to anyone else, than a 
child, and now we have an opportunity to allow someone else to feel 
that love. I have a granddaughter, and I feel so blessed. At 5.45 this 
morning she came into my bedroom, landed her Elvis doll on my 
head, cuddled her little bottom into me and went to sleep and snored 
for an hour. Things like that are priceless …50 
The role of IVF as a ‘cure’ for infertility was crucial to the discursive 
construct of law as a barrier. ‘If medical advancements can help these 
people, it is not the role of Parliament to prevent it.’51 Science was posited as 
a progressive force, aligned with nature, or perhaps with natural progress, 
which parliament should not impede. Paradoxically, then, law becomes both 
the problem and the solution as it ushers in a new era of reform. 
The knowledge that only very small numbers of people will access 
surrogacy was constantly balanced against regular statements about the 
significance of the legislation: ‘This is a very important and personal issue to 
all of us; one that is very tender to us’.52 Infertility was characterised as a 
personal blight and as a social ‘epidemic’, the devastating impact of which 
was known to everyone present as a matter of course, and which harmed not 
only potential parents but their parents and extended family members as 
well.53 As one MP said, ‘We all know the extent and impact of infertility’.54 
John Dawkins, the architect of the original South Australian Private 
Member’s Bill, acknowledged on a number of occasions his own experience 
of infertility: 
My youngest child will be 25 this year, but it seems like only 
yesterday that my wife and I were experiencing considerable trouble 
in having our second child … This was before the days of IVF, but 
                                                           
50  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
pp 750, and 765 (Peter Watson). 
51  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
p 27589 (Clover Moore). 
52  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 December 2008, 
p 922 (Ian Britza). 
53  See, for example, Hidding, n 46, at p 74; NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 28 October 2010, p 27129 (Alan Ashton). 
54  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 9 October 2008, p 3020 (Rosemary Menkens), 
emphasis added. 
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we still went through all sorts of tests … I think that experience … 
allows me to understand the trauma that these people go through … 
Our situation was very much at the small end compared with the 
situation which a lot of people I have met have had to deal with over 
many years.55 
At a later telling, Dawkins concluded: ‘No one understands that until they go 
through it.’56 
The widespread experience of infertility in Australia is a consequence 
of a range of factors, including delayed childbearing, the experience of 
sexually transmitted illness and other environmental factors that impair 
fertility, including treatment for and survival of a range of cancers. While 
there is arguably a significant difference in experience of infertility as a 
result of these various causes, the use of IVF in all instances has established 
a common context and discourse of ‘treatment’. Increasing medical 
acceptance of the use of surrogacy in cases of unexplained infertility and 
recurrent miscarriage has also served to bring surrogacy within the broader 
umbrella of ‘infertility treatment’.57 The construction of infertility as a 
common and readily curable ailment was vital to the almost universal 
legitimisation of surrogacy in the debates. It is through this that law – not 
infertility, science or finance – is the impediment to the ‘human need … to 
have and to care for children’.58 
Nonetheless, the symbolic role of sexual reproduction and its 
relationship with the natural in constructing infertility was a crucial axis of 
contention in the reforms. In essence, opponents argued that the use of IVF 
and surrogacy should be mandated for use only in circumstances that would 
‘repair nature’.59 Ultimately, there was heated debate and significant 
divergence across the various jurisdictions in terms of the final legislative 
provisions restricting or permitting access to IVF or parentage transfer in 
surrogacy on the basis of relationship status and sexual orientation.60 In 
                                                           
55  South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 February 2008, p 1668 
(John Dawkins). 
56  South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 June 2008, p 3376 (John 
Dawkins). 
57  For example, see Genea (2007); Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (NZ) (2007). 
58  See Collier, n 47. 
59  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 November 2007, 
p 6912 (Helen Morton). 
60  In the ACT, access to the surrogacy parentage transfer regime includes heterosexual and 
same-sex couples, but not single people. In Western Australia, access to IVF treatment 
and parentage transfer is open to clinically infertile women and heterosexual couples (this 
expressly excludes age-related infertility), but not to single men or male couples. In South 
Australia, access to the parentage transfer regime is limited to clinically infertile 
heterosexual couples only. In Victoria, access to IVF and parentage transfer, and in 
Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania to parentage transfer, is not limited by 
114 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2012) VOL 21 NO 1 
South Australia, amendments to include same-sex couples were debated and 
defeated, while the opposite occurred in Queensland, New South Wales and 
Tasmania, where amendments to exclude them were raised and defeated (as 
were amendments to exclude unmarried women in Western Australia). Such 
exclusions were claimed to be non-discriminatory because ‘Mother nature 
discriminates at the moment’.61 The words of three Queensland opposition 
MPs ably capture several elements of this construction of the natural: 
Children arise from a relationship between a man and a woman. That 
is how nature intended it …62 
[S]ame sex couples establish their relationship without any natural 
expectation of children.63 
Males do not have wombs.64 
Without wishing to belabour the point, these MPs were all speaking about 
legislation that would facilitate reproduction by women who could not have 
children within their relationship with a man, for reasons including the lack 
of a womb, eggs and the ability to sustain a pregnancy. Thus the ‘natural’ in 
this construct is of the feminised social expectation of childbearing; the 
method of reproduction is entirely displaced. A naturalising discourse of 
maternal desire was also strongly present in the media accounts, in which the 
‘dream’ of being a mother was constantly referenced in stories concerning 
heterosexual couples, as was the experience of wanting to be a mother from 
earliest childhood.65 This reflects Marilyn Strathern’s musings on social or 
‘folk’ understandings of the natural and the biological in surrogacy when she 
asks: ‘Is the desire to have a child as much a biological function as the 
ability to bear one?’66 
In a number of states, opponents characterised the legislation as 
misusing, ‘encumbering’ or ‘contaminating’ a proper ‘cure’ for infertility in 
order to deliberately create same-sex families.67 In Queensland, the 
                                                                                                                              
relationship status. Moreover, the legislative criteria of infertility in these latter four states 
includes both social and clinical infertility. See Millbank (2011).  
61  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly 12 April, p 85 (Elise Archer). 
62  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 11 February 2010, p 268 (Lawrence Springborg). 
63  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 163 (Elizabeth Cunningham); 
echoed at 186 (Dorothy Pratt). 
64  Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 168 (Alex Douglas) and ‘men 
cannot conceive and carry children’ at 208 (Jarrod Bleijie). 
65  For example, see ‘Sister’s Love Puts Impossible Dream Within Grasp’, Liverpool Leader 
3 September 2008; Miles (2007), p 3; Campbell (2010), p 4. 
66  Strathern (2003), p 291. 
67  For example, see Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
2 December 2008, pp 758–59 (Graham Jacobs); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
10 February 2010, p 169 (Mark Robinson) and p 143 (Lawrence Springborg).  
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government Bill was repeatedly characterised by the conservative opposition 
as ‘social engineering’ or a ‘social experiment’,68 which formed an ‘attack on 
our family structure and our society’.69 Terms such as ‘commodification’, 
‘buying’, ‘designing’ and ‘procuring’ children were utilised almost 
exclusively in relation to same-sex couples in the parliamentary debates70 
(a trend paralleled in the press coverage of commercial surrogacy, discussed 
below). Likewise, the desire to parent was rendered unnatural through a 
series of dehumanising metaphors: children for gay and lesbian parents were 
variously described as ‘pets’, ‘trophies’ and ‘toys’.71 The role of parliament 
in ‘allowing’ children to be born to same-sex couples was analogised to 
deliberately disabling children through forcing them to be born blind and 
deaf72 or with arms and legs ‘lopped off’,73 and was also repeatedly equated 
with the forced removal of Aboriginal children in the Stolen Generations:74 
‘This Bill is one more iterative step towards the diminution of the role of 
natural families, natural parents and natural parenting.’75 
Yet the meaning of the natural, the (in)fertile and the relationship of 
heterosexuality to both proved to be quite unstable, and notably gendered. In 
Western Australia, eligibility rested upon a definition of infertility from pre-
existing ART legislation allowing clinically infertile women access to IVF, 
whether or not they were in a relationship. Thus locating (in)fertility in the 
woman allows lesbians and single women, but not men, access to IVF for 
surrogacy in Western Australia. Despite the largely gender-neutral talk of 
‘same-sex couples and single people’ it was clear that gay men were the 
main target of hostility. Indeed, in Queensland several members of the 
opposition noted that they actually supported an element of the government 
                                                           
68  For example, see Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 161 (Shane 
Knuth), pp 169, 171 (Mark Robinson); ‘baby engineering’, p 193 (David Gibson). One 
government MP countered that the exclusion of same-sex couples was ‘a form of 
unconscious, mindless eugenics’ because it would ‘legislatively eliminate people from the 
gene pool’: p 187 (Dean Wells). 
69  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 157 (Rosemary Menkens).  
70  For example, see Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 June 
2008, p 4396 (Helen Morton); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, 
p 139 (Lawrence Springborg), p 145 (Ray Hopper ) and p 184 (Rob Messenger). 
71  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 145 (Ray Hopper), p 161 
(Shane Knuth), p 193 (David Gibson). 
72  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
p 751 (Peter Abetz). 
73  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 145 (Ray Hopper quoting a 
submission from the Australian Family Association). 
74  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 173 (Rob Messenger); Western 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 December 2008, pp 917–19 
(Tom Stephens). See also WA Legislative Council, 27 November 2008, p 583 (Helen 
Morton); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 27 October 2010, p 26924 
(Greg Donnelly). 
75  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 June 2008, p 4396 
(Helen Morton). 
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Bill that automatically extended parental rights to second female parents in 
existing and future lesbian-led families formed through ART:76  
Today single women also access the new fertility programs. It is 
natural for a woman to conceive … The desire of a woman to have a 
child is a very strong one and lesbian couples have found ways [to do 
so].77 
Males cannot mother a child – that is, carry a child in their body … 
But lesbian women can.78 
The naturalisation of maternality, even absent gestation, was critical to 
this distinction: ‘Two dads cannot give a child a mother’s love.’79 This 
played out in a slightly different way in the Tasmanian debates, as the 
conservative opposition tried to exclude lesbian and gay couples but was 
happy to allow access to single women. The implication that men, and most 
especially male couples, are ‘unnatural’ parents arises from, and plays into, 
long-standing cultural tropes of gay men as dangerous to children by virtue 
of predatory, hyper-sexual and paedophilic tendencies.80 The relative 
acceptance of single mothers and lesbian couple parenting in part reflects the 
fact that women have been less subject to such tropes, but it also arises from 
the discursive construct of surrogacy as a practice by and for women. As one 
female MP began: ‘Like me, most women would look for a surrogate with 
whom they could have a partnership of heart …’81 Strathern has argued that 
the presence of the intended mother to receive the child at the end of the 
arrangement is required to make the process of ‘surrogacy’, or substitution, a 
complete and intelligible social process that creates a ‘real’ mother.82 As 
noted earlier, the media coverage markedly centred female voices, desires 
and experiences of ‘motherhood’ while male participants were 
backgrounded (even though they much more commonly had a genetic link to 
the child).  
Those who favoured non-discriminatory access to surrogacy laws did 
not contest the idea of the natural; rather, they reframed it by emphatically 
locating ‘nature’ in the domain of parental love: 
The evolutionary process has already occurred – a child has been 
born; biology has done its job – and if that child is raised by two 
                                                           
76  See Springborg, n 62, p 139. 
77  See Pratt, n 63, pp 185–86.  
78  See Douglas, n 64, p 168. 
79  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 183 (Rob Messenger). 
80  For example, see Morgan (1996); Henderson (1996). 
81  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 May 2007, p 1784 
(Judy Hughes). 
82  Strathern (2003), p 294. 
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loving, responsible and caring parents then that child will be the 
recipient of the necessary parental ingredients.83  
As with the harm of infertility, evidence of loving parenting was most 
frequently asserted by reference to personal observation: 
[W]here there were two female parents or two male parents – as I 
came across in education … the main thing was the love for those 
children because in the end, that made the absolute difference.84 
Present at that [LGBT] function were couples with children. There 
was a little child running around, and I knew – you felt it – they were 
being raised in a loving environment.85 
Like the Premier and other members, my own experience from 
having met single mothers, single fathers and gay and lesbian parents 
tells me [they can raise a child as successfully as heterosexual 
couples.] All of the evidence strongly suggests that it is a home 
environment filled with love, care, compassion and respect that is the 
most important factor in a child’s upbringing and wellbeing.86 
In addition, there was a discursive construction of children born through 
surrogacy as more loved than other children. Proponents of reforms 
interwove their remarks with references to children born through surrogacy 
as ‘desperately’ wanted, planned and painfully striven for, and therefore 
more likely to be well loved and cared for.  
[A]n advantage of surrogacy is that it is always a deliberate act. It is a 
considered act, and ultimately it is an act of love and an act of 
creation … that is a very good start in life … the surrogate child will 
be loved, wanted and valued.87 
The responsible intentional parenting of surrogacy was not infrequently 
contrasted with the ‘genetic lottery’ or ‘3am nightclub tryst’ of conventional 
conception, which could entail children being accidental, unwanted and/or 
abused.88 However, the prominent discourse of caregiving and love was not 
entirely contiguous with support for social parenting; rather, it 
uncomfortably coexisted with an underlying genetic essentialism. 
                                                           
83  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 166 (Lindy Nelson-Carr). 
84  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 2011, p 66 (Brian Wightman). 
85  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 11 February 2010, p 267 (Grace Grace). 
86  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 165 (Steve Wettenhall). 
87  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, p 764 (Martin Whitely). 
88  For example, see Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, p 761 
(Andrew Waddell) and p 763 (Paul Papalia). 
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The Rise of Genetics: 100 Per Cent Our Child 
Many scholars have noted an increasing emphasis on genetic relatedness as 
an artefact of legal, social and medical significance.89 In surrogacy, the 
valorisation of genetic relatedness and a de-emphasis on the gestational 
relationship are key to the construct of the intended parents as ‘real’ parents. 
In both sites of reform dialogue, gestational surrogacy was strongly 
preferenced. However, ‘relatedness’ encompassed both more and less than a 
dual genetic link with intended parents. Many families in the media coverage 
involved the use of donor eggs, while in parliamentary debates the 
valorisation of relatedness was strongly present through an indirect relation: 
the recurrent motif of the surrogate as sister to the intended mother.  
In media coverage, the vast majority of surrogacy arrangements were 
clearly identifiable as gestational surrogacy.90 The claim that intended 
parents were the ‘real’ parents based on genetics was common: ‘Yasmin was 
his tummy mummy and I was his real mummy.’91 Such claims are explicable 
in the sense that most of the intended parents were participating in reform 
dialogue specifically in order to gain legal status as parents; thus they 
focused on the ‘absurdity’ of their genetic tie conflicting with a lack of legal 
status. Intended parents stated that ‘we’d have to adopt our own DNA’ and 
were described as ‘legalising the genetic bond’, or as ‘biological mother and 
father in legal wait for rights’.92 
Numerous media accounts referred to ‘our own child’, ‘our own flesh 
and blood’ and ‘100% our child genetically’. There was little or no reflection 
on the importance of social parenting and no acknowledgement of the 
‘biological’ contribution of the birth mother. This accords with Heléna 
Ragoné’s finding in her ethnographic work that couples involved in 
gestational surrogacy in the United States placed less emphasis on the 
contribution of the birth mother than those who engaged in genetic 
surrogacy.93 Yet it is striking that the discourse of genetic essentialism was 
so prevalent in the Australian media, given that less than half of the 
arrangements involved both intended parents’ gametes.94 Centring genetic 
parentage as the basis of ‘real’ parentage may therefore be undermining to 
                                                           
89  For example, see Boyd (2007); Dolgin (2000). 
90  Of the 69 arrangements, 51 involved gestational surrogacy, five were identified as genetic 
surrogacy and a further thirteen were unclear. 
91  Faggotter (2010). 
92  Walsh (2009), p 7; Tydd (2007), p 4; Wallace (2008), p 5, respectively. 
93  Ragoné (2003), pp 217–18. 
94  In all, 29 arrangements reported that both intended parents’ gametes were involved. In 
addition to the five genetic surrogacies and thirteen arrangements where it was unclear 
whether the surrogacy was genetic or gestational, there were eighteen gestational 
arrangements reporting that a donor egg and the intended father’s sperm were used, one in 
which the intended mother’s egg and donor sperm was used, and another three 
arrangements in which the intended mother’s egg had been or would be used, but it was 
not apparent whether the intended mother had a male partner.  
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the parental claims of the significant portion of mothers who have utilised 
donor eggs in the context of surrogacy (and indeed outside it).95 
Media narratives about the birth mother stress her agency, fortitude and 
the generosity and magnitude of her contribution; there was constant 
reference to her ‘incredible gift’, often accompanied in the cases of non-
commercial surrogacy by the explanation that it was she who had offered to 
undertake surrogacy.96 However, these characterisations took place within a 
prevalent erasure of her maternality. In addition to ‘surrogate’ meaning 
literally a substitute or deputy, the discursive erasure of the birth mother was 
accomplished through a variety of descriptors and metaphors, such as 
‘babysitter’, ‘carrier pigeon’, ‘stand in’ mother and ‘loaned’ womb.97 The 
most common metaphor by far reduced birth mothers to an inanimate vessel: 
the oven.98 (The parliamentary debates also revealed similar terminology, 
although less frequently used, including: ‘vessel’, ‘vehicle’ and 
‘incubator’.99) While ‘just the oven’ often came from the mouths of birth 
mothers themselves, and was clearly a playful reference to common parlance 
(‘bun in the oven’), it is nonetheless extremely revealing. In this frame, the 
genetic parents have provided the baby (which is ‘100%’ theirs) and all the 
birth mother does is ‘cook’ it. This supports Janet Dolgin’s observation that 
‘genes’ have replaced ‘blood’ in the ideology of ‘blood’ ties as the core of 
traditional family.100 Gestational surrogate mothers are in a very real sense 
biological or blood relatives, having shared a circulatory system with the 
child they gestate. Yet ‘biological’ motherhood was used exclusively in the 
media accounts to mean genetic motherhood.  
Interestingly, there was much more focus on social parenting in the 
parliamentary debates than in the media coverage. Statements such as 
‘Families come in all shapes and sizes … It is impossible to determine who 
will or will not be a good parent’101 were repeatedly made by MPs speaking 
in favour of the reforms. In Queensland in particular, government members 
argued that the legislation reflected family diversity and social change of a 
positive kind: 
I am a 63-year-old woman who has a wealth of life experiences. I 
was raised in a single-parent household from the age of four years 
and have experienced a happy marriage for the past 42 years … 
Many different family structures exist today. The two-parent family 
of the 1950s has given way to single parents, de facto, blended and 
                                                           
95  See Konrad (2005). 
96  For example, see Walsh (2009), p 7; Dibben (2009b), p 28.  
97  Walsh (2009), p 7; Dibben (2008), p 62; Miles (2007), p 3 respectively.  
98  For example, see Dibben (2008), p 62; Nader (2010), p 10; ‘Surrogate Success: Lisa’s 
Mother of All Battles’, Manly Daily, 12 August 2008; Ambrose (2009), p 31. 
99  For example, see Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
8 May 2007, p 1785 (Judith Hughes) and 10 May 2007, p 2110 (Sue Walker). 
100  Dolgin (2000), p 525. 
101  See Grace, n 85, p 266. 
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same-sex couple families. Society is continually changing and 
evolving. Our legislation processes and attitudes, by necessity, 
change with it … People must make their own choices and do the 
best they can. I am not going to tell them how they should go about 
[parenting] but I will do all within my power to support Queensland 
families – all Queensland families.102  
As with knowledge of infertility, claims about the value and importance of 
non-biological parenting were constantly based on personal experience:  
[My social father] was the one who was a parent to me. Anybody can 
be a sperm donor, but to be a parent takes the ability to love, nurture 
and cherish a child.103	  
One member whose wife had been hospitalised for several weeks after his 
daughter’s birth narrated this incident and his subsequent experience of 
parenting his newborn at some length, reflecting on both genetic and ‘early 
maternal bonding’ claims made by opponents of reform, concluding: 
It was not about those early days of bonding; it has been about the 
lives we have lived ever since … [Our] relationship is not born out of 
genetic material; it was born out of shared experience. My daughter is 
not like me because we share 50 per cent of the same genes but 
because I raised her … She is our daughter because we raised her, not 
because we are genetically related to her.104	  
In Western Australia, the attempts of an Aboriginal MP to articulate a 
broader cultural conception of family was initially mocked: 
Mrs C.A. Martin: I am an Aboriginal woman; I have 3000 family 
members. I know a bit about family. However, a lot of people … 
Mr R.F. Johnson: Three thousand? 
Mrs C.A. Martin: Thousands! 
Mr R.F. Johnson: It must be an expensive Christmas for you then! 
Nonetheless, Carol Martin went on to articulate the significance of extended 
family in raising children in Aboriginal families, as well as the debilitating 
impact of diseases such as diabetes on their fertility,105 in a manner which 
was clearly influential on other members as the debate continued. 
                                                           
102  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, pp 150–51 (Christine Smith). 
103  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 May 2007, p 1777 
(Dianne Guice). 
104  See Waddell, n 88, p 761. 
105  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
pp 767–68.  
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The parliamentary debates could therefore be characterised as more 
transformative than the media narratives in the sense that they overtly 
contributed to a discourse legitimating family diversity and non-normative 
family formation. In media coverage, the emphasis was rather on the 
normality of the surrogacy families, no matter how unusual their 
circumstances. This accords with Maggie Kirkman’s narrative analysis in 
her scholarly work, where she interviewed donor conception families and 
found that parents ‘on the whole, wanted their families to be perceived as 
“normal”’, frequently ‘accommodating as best they can to the canonical 
narrative of genetic connection’.106 
Yet the discursive construction of genetics as determinative of the ‘real’ 
or ‘biological’ parents was also clearly influential in the parliamentary 
sphere. The idea of ‘pure’ surrogacy entailing the absence of genetic link 
between birth mother and child, and the presence of it with both intended 
parents was initially prevalent.107 In the first parentage transfer regime 
introduced in Australia (in the ACT in 2004), access was limited to 
gestational surrogacy in which at least one intended parent had a genetic 
link.108 In later reforms, these restrictions waned somewhat.109 The manner in 
which these requirements appeared, and were often argued down, illustrates 
the unexpectedly malleable quality of discourses of genetic relatedness. 
In Western Australia, the commitment to ‘pure’ surrogacy was so 
pronounced that several members proposed that it should not only be 
mandatory but enforceable, such that the ‘real’ parents had a guarantee in 
law that the birth mother could be compelled to relinquish a child who had 
‘nothing to do with her’.110 This position was also voiced unsuccessfully in 
the New South Wales debates: 
For [a gestational surrogate to] say at the time of birth they want to 
keep the child is, in my view, no different from kidnapping or baby 
snatching … That is no different from snatching a pram outside a shop 
or going into a nursery in a hospital and stealing a baby out of a crib.111 
                                                           
106  Kirkman (2004), p 15. 
107  See Morton, n 59, p 6915. 
108  Dual genetic-link gestational surrogacy was mandated in the original South Australian Bill 
(which was further restricted to surrogates related to the intended parents, and did not 
pass). Statutes Amendment (Surrogacy) Bill 2006 (SA).  
109  In Western Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania, amendments to the Bills to 
exclude genetic surrogacy and to mandate a genetic link with intended parents were 
debated but defeated. South Australia ultimately did require a genetic link with at least 
one intended parent, while the Victorian reforms excluded genetic surrogacy from the use 
of licensed ART but still permitted access to parentage transfer: see Millbank (2011). 
110  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 November 2007, 
p 7060 (Robyn McSweeney). See also contributions by Johnson, Woolard, Hughes, 
Halligan, Walker, Jacobs, Thomas, Whitely, Doust and Harvey. 
111  NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009, p 19253 
(Amanda Fazio). 
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This view of a dual genetic link as trumping – indeed erasing – gestational 
connection was repeatedly placed within the rhetoric of the child’s best 
interests. For opponents to the reforms, genetic parenting and children’s 
welfare were absolutely conflated.112 This is especially striking given that the 
forced removal of children from birth mothers was being advocated – a 
practice universally condemned in the context of both duress adoptions and 
Aboriginal Stolen Generations in Australia’s recent history. After exhaustive 
debate, Western Australia reached a ‘compromise’ position: the legislation 
included a presumption that transfer of parentage was in the child’s best 
interests, and the consent of the birth mother could be overridden if she was 
not a genetic parent and one of the intended parents was, a provision 
replicated in the 2011 Tasmanian Bill. This provision was a dramatic 
departure from the wholly consent-based model of parentage transfer 
originally drawn from the United Kingdom, and did not reflect the views of 
intended parents expressed in the media or in the parliamentary inquiries.113  
The UK legislation and research provide an instructive point of 
comparison to the Australian controversy over genetic surrogacy. The UK 
parentage transfer provisions have always included both genetic and 
gestational surrogacy, and genetic surrogacy appears to have been a fairly 
common form of arrangement in the United Kingdom until quite recently. 
Research by Susan Golombok and her team that drew upon participants who 
had used the UK parentage transfer regime in the period 2000–02 found a 
relatively even split of genetic and gestational surrogacy arrangements.114 
Yet in Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania 
there were attempts to amend Bills to prohibit genetic surrogacy on the basis 
that it was more likely to involve difficulty in relinquishment and to generate 
ongoing grief and identity confusion for both birth mother and child. 
Although these issues were prominent in the Re Evelyn case, as generalised 
assumptions they are not borne out by the psychological or sociological 
research. Neither the Golombok research nor a number of other qualitative 
studies of birth mothers undertaken by Olga van den Akker found significant 
differences along genetic–non-genetic lines in either birth mothers’ or 
intended parents’ experiences of the pregnancy, relinquishment of, or 
subsequent relationship with, the child.115  
                                                           
112  Alison Diduck (2007) argues that this conflation is on the rise in the family law context. 
113  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK), c 37, s 30, since repealed and 
replaced by Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK), c 22, s 54. For example, 
see Queensland Parliament (2008), pp 17, 18. 
114  The Golombok study of 34 birth mothers comprised nineteen genetic and fifteen 
gestational arrangements: see Jadva et al (2003), p 2197. The overlapping cohort of 42 
intended parents comprised 26 genetic and fourteen gestational surrogacies: MacCallum et 
al (2003), p 1337. Olga van den Akker (1998) suggests that there is a marked contrast in 
the practice of those pursuing surrogacy through IVF in clinic settings (which are almost 
exclusively gestational surrogacies) and those engaging in surrogacy conceptions 
informally (which are often genetic). 
115  See Jadva et al (2003); MacCallum et al (2003); van den Akker (1998, 2003, 2005). 
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Intriguingly, while these amendments restricting genetic surrogacy 
were all argued down, this was not through reference to the research, but 
rather through reliance on an idealised archetype of sisters participating in 
surrogacy. It was repeatedly argued that excluding genetic surrogacy in 
general would prevent siblings from engaging in it, and thus preclude ‘the 
best’ or ‘most perfect’ arrangements from taking place.116  
As I understand it – from the surrogacy stories that I have read in 
women’s magazines! – the sibling story seems to be quite a common 
one. I therefore do not agree with [the amendment] because I think 
we would in fact lose a lot of very good surrogacies if we were to 
insist on this amendment. Obviously, when a sibling is involved, 
there is a genetic relationship in one sense.117  
In this dialogue the (undesirable) direct genetic link the birth mother would 
have with the child was subsumed in favour of the indirect genetic link, or 
‘family genetic connection’, that the intended mother would be enabled to 
have with the child (by virtue of her being a genetic aunt). 
Mr Hidding: But as much as it can be, that child is the mother’s child 
as well as the father’s. 
Mr Booth: But the point is that if you have a family situation here 
where you have a loving sister who is prepared to support her sister in 
that way … It is a great way of having a surrogacy and ending up 
with very similar genetic character types to your own family, and 
presumably most of us like to see some genetic trait.118  
Siblings were universally presented as a safe relational environment in 
which surrogacy could – indeed should – occur. The familial/genetic 
relationship between birth and intended mother was seen to render surrogacy 
a family-building or family-enhancing practice, such that it extended and 
strengthened existing family bonds rather than ‘fragmenting’ parental 
relationships. In the words of one member, the ‘family connection … 
tightened up the relationship and did not bring a total stranger into the 
fray’.119 
                                                           
116  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
p 785 (Jim McGinty) and Legislative Council, 27 November 2008, pp 583–84 (Kate 
Doust) and p 584 (Simon O’Brien); NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
27 October 2010, p 26943 (John Hatzistergos); Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Assembly, 12 April 2011, pp 71 and 87 (David Bartlett) and 14 April 2011, pp 51 and 
60 (Kim Booth). 
117  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
p 782 (Alannah MacTiernan).  
118  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 14 April 2011, p 61. Emphasis 
added. 
119  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 27 November 2008, 
p 584 (Kate Doust). 
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The media accounts likewise presented surrogacy within the context of 
existing relationships as something that strengthened family bonds and 
formed comprehensible genetic links: ‘The already close sisters will now 
have a bond that will unite them forever.’120 Yet it is worth noting that, of the 
arrangements reported in the media, less than half involved a birth mother 
who was previously known to the parties.121 Moreover, arrangements with a 
known birth mother were roughly divided between family and friends.122 
Within the portion of arrangements involving relatives the paradigm from 
the parliamentary debates of ‘a sister having children for her sister and, 
sometimes, a mother having children for her daughter’ was in fact 
accurate,123 in that most relatives were sisters (although there were also two 
mothers, one aunt and two cousins who acted as birth mothers). Yet relatives 
actually accounted for less than a quarter of the overall arrangements, and 
sisters made up only 10 per cent of the total cohort of birth mothers.124  
Sisters were a constant touchstone in the parliamentary debates. Yet the 
reliance by parliamentarians – across no less than four jurisdictions – upon 
genetic surrogacy by siblings as the principal justification for the inclusion 
of genetic surrogacy appears to have been utterly misplaced. Not one of the 
surrogacies involving relatives reported in the media – including that of the 
Kirkmans – involved the birth mother using her own egg. (Indeed, as three 
of the sisters involved were in fact sisters of the intended father, this would 
have involved consanguinity.) A search of the online content of the most 
popular Australian women’s magazines, including New Idea, Woman’s Day, 
Women’s Weekly and Marie Claire, reveals many celebrity commercial 
surrogacy stories, but not one instance of sibling genetic surrogacy.125 The 
apocryphal image of sibling genetic surrogacy may simply be a reflection 
that the ‘sensible’ surrogacy of the Kirkman sisters was held in mind 
inaccurately. However I suggest that it indicates an elastic notion of genetic 
                                                           
120  Sikora (2008), p 15. See also n 22. 
121  Of 69 arrangements, in 36 the birth mother had been previously unknown to the intended 
parents (of these, 33 were commercial arrangements), and in a further six the previous 
relationship of the parties was unclear. 
122  In twelve arrangements, the birth mother was a friend, while fifteen arrangements 
involved a birth mother who was related to one of the intended parents. In twelve cases, 
the birth mother was related to the intended mother and in three to the intended father. 
123  See Burney, n 2, p 27120. 
124  Limited UK figures suggest that around a quarter of gestational arrangements through IVF 
clinics may involve sisters. At the Bourn Hall Clinic in England, over ten years from 1989 
to 1998, of 41 IVF surrogacy arrangements, fifteen involved relatives, of whom nine were 
sisters and five were sisters-in-law to the intended mother: see Brisden (2003), p 103. Tim 
Appleton, a counsellor who worked with three different UK IVF clinics, reported that, of 
143 arrangements in his experience, 43 involved relatives (which included 20 sisters and 
fifteen sisters-in-law of the intended mother), 28 friends and 72 parties who were 
previously unknown to each other: Appleton (2003), p 200.  
125  Searchable through: <http://au.lifestyle.yahoo.com/new-idea>; 
<http://womansday.ninemsn.com.au>; <http://aww.ninemsn.com.au>. One story of sibling 
gestational surrogacy appeared: Brygel (2009) (concerning the Rushfords, see also n 152). 
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connection, encompassing non-linear genetic links and broader ideas of 
‘relatedness’ within discourses of surrogacy. This elasticity concerning 
relatedness undercut dominant discourses of genetic determinism and 
combined with evolving notions of family diversity to allow less restrictive 
legislation to eventually pass in the majority of Australian jurisdictions.  
Money Changes Everything 
On the role of payment, the parliamentary debates and the media accounts 
were utterly divided. The media reports revealed a surprisingly high 
proportion of families who were prepared to acknowledge commercial 
surrogacy arrangements. Of the 69 surrogacy arrangements in the media 
survey, almost half – 33 – involved declared payment to the birth mother 
beyond expenses. Given the historical condemnation of commercial 
surrogacy in Australia, it was even more surprising that the reports were 
generally positive, or neutral, about the fact that money had been paid. 
Indeed, taken as a whole, the media reports explored a complex array of 
meanings about payment in surrogacy. Anita Stuhmcke notes that the 
dearth of discussion surrounding the criminalisation of commercial 
surrogacy is remarkable in light of the [24 separate] inquiries held across 
Australian jurisdictions into surrogacy between 1983 and 2009 …126 
‘Commercial’ surrogacy had deliberately been excluded from the scope 
of reforms. Thus statements about commercial surrogacy tended to be simple 
expostulations, such as: ‘All of us in this parliament stand very firmly 
against commercial surrogacy’,127 ‘Paid surrogacy is the exploitation of 
working people’128 and, in the opening quote of this article, not ‘part of the 
Australian culture’. The reform agenda was explicitly framed as being about, 
and limited to, ‘altruistic’ surrogacy: 
My government firmly believes that no one should be able to make a 
commercial profit from their reproductive capacities, and that is not 
an issue that we intend to be revisited.129  
This appears to have been a consciously legitimating discourse that cast all 
bad practice, exploitation and risk of harm into the realm of the commercial 
in order to liberalise laws for unpaid surrogacy. An unfortunate product of 
this strategy was that there was no attempt to unpack what is ‘commercial’, 
no inquiry into the actual costs of surrogacy or exploration of the meaning 
and role of payment to those involved. The idea that monetary payment acts 
                                                           
126  Stuhmcke (2001), p 601. 
127  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates 11 February 2010, p 281 (Cameron Dick).  
128  Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 
p 756 (Bill Johnston). Emphasis added. 
129  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 14 February 2008, pp 224–25 (Anna Bligh). 
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as an effective proxy for all forms of exploitative practice went totally 
unquestioned in the parliamentary sphere: 
[T]he surrogates about whom I am talking are people who volunteer 
out of love and their wish that a relative of theirs may have the joy of 
their own child. I think we need to remember that when we hear some 
of the stories about all the terrible things that may have gone wrong 
in other parts of the world where money has changed hands.130 
In fact, only one MP even questioned whether continuing to impose 
prison sentences for individuals involved in commercial surrogacy was 
justified, as he argued that the best interests of children may not be well 
served by having their parents incarcerated as a result of the circumstances 
of their conception.131 
The contrast with the media approach to commercial surrogacy was 
stark. Of the 33 cases involving payment, reports could be characterised as 
falling roughly within four approaches: positive, neutral, contested or 
negative.132 In all, there were twelve reports about surrogacy involving 
payment to the birth mother which were broadly positive in tone, ten neutral 
reports, six reports where views about payment were contested and only five 
that were unequivocally negative.  
It is noteworthy that, of the five negative reports, three concerned gay 
male couples while one related to a single woman. Given that there were 
only sixteen gay male couples and one single woman in the overall cohort of 
69 participant families,133 their over-representation in negative press suggests 
that it was not paid surrogacy per se that was the cause of the negative 
                                                           
130  South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 27 September 2006, p 764 
(John Dawkins), emphasis added. 
131  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 2010, p 193 (David Gibson). 
132  These classifications were based on the following criteria. Positive reports included one or 
more comments from participants about the benefits of payment, contained no quotes 
from contradictors and the story was told with a generally supportive authorial tone. 
Neutral reports included details of payment with little or no comment from either 
participants or the author about this element of the narrative. Contested reports included 
comments from participants about the benefits of payment but also included quotes from 
contradictors opposed to surrogacy (usually religious or ethics commentators) and/or 
queries about the ethics of payment from the author. Negative reports contained few 
comments from participants about the benefits of payment (and such comments were 
framed as participants ‘defending’ their actions), had a greater focus on contradictors and 
all contained a clear authorial tone of condemnation. Although expressions such as ‘rent a 
womb’ and ‘buying babies’ were occasionally quoted in the contested reports, this 
language was a key feature of the negative reports, appearing both through quotes from 
contradictors and as direct descriptors used by the author, in addition to other expressions 
denoting commodification such as ‘baby factory’, ‘designer baby’, ‘bought’ ‘ordered’ and 
‘baby shopping’. For example, see Hellard (2007), p 2; McLean (2008), p 4. 
133  There were also eight female intended parents who did not identify their relationship 
status. 
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judgment, but rather the fact that it was undertaken by non-normative 
families. This finding was in keeping with the parliamentary debates, in 
which much of the opposition concerned the sexuality and marital status of 
intended parents. The only heterosexual married couple to participate in paid 
surrogacy and receive negative press involved extreme circumstances: an 
intended father who was accused of causing the baby’s death at the age of 
fifteen weeks. Payment and death were discursively linked through the 
titling of the report: ‘Cash Baby Tragedy’.134  
The positive, neutral and contested reports traverse a range of ideas 
about money, including its meaning to participants personally as well as its 
role in a structural sense in terms of creating reproductive ‘markets’ that 
reflect or generate power imbalances. It is noteworthy that some of the most 
strongly positive stories involved comment from the birth mother herself on 
these issues, which was taken to negate her imputed status as exploitee or 
victim.  
All of the acknowledged commercial arrangements took place outside 
Australia. Of these overseas paid arrangements, twelve had taken place in 
India and nineteen occurred in the United States, with a further two proposed 
for the United States. It was clear that payment was more contentious when 
it took place outside of the developed world. The overwhelming majority of 
the positive stories concerned paid surrogacy in the United States,135 while 
India featured more prominently in the contested stories. Indeed, it was 
within the contested stories that discussion of structural power imbalance 
took place and the role of poverty in generating ‘supply’ and potentially 
vitiating the birth mother’s genuine consent were examined. So, for 
example, the statement in the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
discussion paper that overseas surrogacy ‘risks the exploitation of poor 
families for the benefit of rich ones’136 was openly critiqued by intended 
parents. Megan Sainsbury responded: 
None of us would ever exploit a person from a Third World country 
… India has some of the strictest regulations regarding psychological 
testing in the world for surrogates and potential parents. They do not 
accept people who are purely in it for the money or those who want 
to exploit someone less fortunate than themselves.137 
Elsewhere, Rodney Cruise echoed the view that screening processes 
ensured informed consent and added that the assumption that all surrogacy 
in India entailed exploitation was ‘unfair’ and ‘patronising’, as it was based 
on the notion that ‘women in India were less capable then Western women 
                                                           
134  Dowsley and Lapthorne (2007), pp 1, 4. 
135  Over one-third of the paid arrangements concerned India, but these appeared in only two 
of the positive stories, while the remaining ten concerned surrogacy in the United States. 
136  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Joint Working Group (2009), pp 4–5.  
137  Benson (2009), p 1. 
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of informed choices’.138 Legal scholar Anita Stuhmcke was quoted at length 
on her position that money and exploitation had been unthinkingly correlated 
in Australian policy: 
[S]imply because an arrangement is commercial, it doesn’t mean it’s 
exploitation … And just because an arrangement isn’t commercial 
doesn’t mean somebody isn’t being exploited. You can imagine the 
pressure in families if one person cannot have a child. There is 
pressure from daughters on their mothers and between sisters. I’m not 
sure that simply because we call it altruistic surrogacy means it’s all 
loving and there is no exploitation.139 
For some participants, money signified clarity, in that it contributed to a 
clear understanding of their respective roles within a well-defined 
framework that was characterised as responsible and regulated,140 in addition 
to being commercial. Thus payment rendered the arrangement ‘clear cut’ and 
‘easier’141 for all concerned, as well as ‘fairer’. For some, payment was 
expressed as a moral imperative: ‘I would never expect someone to carry a 
baby for me and not be compensated for pain and suffering. People still die 
in childbirth.’142 Intended parents explained that payment made a very partial 
contribution towards redressing what they would always experience as a 
profound debt to the birth mother: 
It’s still a little bit hard for me because we’ve been given this 
fantastic gift – and the children are a gift – and what can we give in 
return? Money doesn’t cover it. There’s nothing I can give her of 
equal value and sometimes that’s hard.143 
The discourse around payment in the media was permeated with a 
notably domesticating tone: money was repeatedly characterised as spent on, 
or sacrificed from, children’s education and family homes.144 Several stories 
note that intended parents had mortgaged, or remortgaged, their homes in 
order to pay for commercial surrogacy. Thus payment represented a sacrifice 
on the part of intended parents rather than an expression of wealth or 
                                                           
138  Bruce-Rosser (2008), p 1.  
139  Overington and Pelly (2009), p 11.  
140  For example, see McDougall (2008), p 1, 4. 
141  For example, see ‘Surrogate Success: Lisa’s Mother of All Battles’ Manly Daily, 
12 August 2008; Ambrose (2009), p 31; Phillips (2009), p 14. 
142  See McDougall (2008), pp 1, 4. 
143  Sharelle Wormald in Grant (2009). This involved payment of around $30,000 to the birth 
mother, out of a total cost of $130,000. 
144  See also X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWCH 3030, in which the judge 
‘domesticates’ the commercial aspect of the surrogacy agreement by repeatedly 
characterising the 27,000 Euros as a sum that allowed the birth mother and her husband to 
put a deposit on a small flat.  
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exercise of consumer power. Wealth disparities between birth mother and 
intended parents were usually acknowledged within a narrative frame in 
which payment transformed the life of the birth mother, through allowing 
her to provide for her own family in a way she could never have done 
otherwise. Thus: 
Ironically Mark and Allan mortgaged their home to hire a surrogate, 
while the fee she received enabled her to pay off her own home 
loan.145 
More commonly, payment was referred to as the means by which an Indian 
birth mother could provide an education for her children.146 In this way, 
payment was discursively shifted from the commercial to the domestic, and 
the power of money from the structural to the personal. 
One of the most dramatic counter-narratives about the role and meaning 
of payment was presented by Sharelle Wormald, who was born without a 
uterus. In a series of media reports, Sharelle characterised an horrific 
accident in her early adulthood as a ‘blessing’ or ‘blessing in disguise’ 
because her lump sum accident compensation payment enabled her to afford 
commercial surrogacy in the United States (at a total cost of around 
$130,000): 
I was a passenger in a head-on car crash … I heard my back break 
and I knew what I was in for, I knew what I had done … You know 
I’d do the accident again and live with the pain again, cause how do 
you choose between being pain-free and having your children? You’d 
pick your kids, without a second thought, I would. I’d pick them 
again.147 
In this telling, the ‘commercial’ character of money is subsumed within a 
narrative of bodily suffering (notably a suffering additional to that of 
infertility) in which money is not earned or spent. As such, rather than 
contaminating or commodifying reproduction, it simply fulfils appropriate 
maternal longing.  
Sharelle was one of several participants in commercial arrangements 
who maintained a close and ongoing relationship with a birth mother from 
the United States. These participants stressed that although money was a 
necessary part of the arrangement, it was not the sole motivation for the birth 
mother, nor a defining feature of their relationship. This reflects the findings 
of Heléna Ragoné’s ethnographic study of commercial surrogacy in the 
United States.148 Shannon McVey, the birth mother for Sharelle, expressed 
                                                           
145  Chatfield (2010), p 13.  
146  For example, see Hodge n 138; Nine Network (2009); Ravichandran (2010). 
147  See Nine Network (2007a). See also Metlikovec (2007). 
148  See Ragoné (2003), p 212. 
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payment as something that was essential but nonetheless unrelated to 
motivation: 
Well the money played a small part, because, you know, we wouldn't 
be able to do it for free. Because, you know, we sacrificed our family 
a lot … My time … and there was a lot of doctors appointments and 
stuff … But basically just knowing that there are families out there 
that can’t have children and I am just so thankful and fortunate that I 
am able to, and I am glad to be a tool in that, helping that family to 
grow.149 
Sharelle re-characterised their relationship as a familial one, referring to 
Shannon as the children’s ‘Aunty Shanny’ (and Shannon’s children as 
cousins of her own), placing a photo of Shannon next to the children’s 
cots,150 and exchanging visits and gifts.151 Likewise, in a television interview 
the intended mother of twin boys, Lisa Banfield, and the birth mother, Krisy 
Prelewicz, minimised the significance of money in their relationship:  
Interviewer: What started out as a business deal has evolved into a 
strong friendship. Of the $300,000 Lisa and John spent trying to have 
a baby, Krisy received about $60,000. But she says it was never about 
the money.  
Krisy Prelewicz: Altruism was the guiding factor in this, definitely, 
and one of the surrogates broke it down to – I think it was five cents 
an hour – when they figured payment versus time put out, so it’s not 
about the money. It’s very much about helping somebody.  
Lisa Banfield: And she offered after the boys were born, we had 
remaining embryos, she’d do it again without any money, and I got 
goosebumps just saying that right now. Not because I don’t want 
more children, but because it was just such an amazing thing to do.  
Interviewer: Does the offer still stand, Krisy?  
Krisy: If we did it immediately.  
Lisa: No, we’re very happy with our two, aren’t we? Aren’t we? I 
look at Krisy and I don't even look at [husband] John! You’re off the 
hook, don’t worry.  
Krisy: Whew! The way it’s turned out has been an additional 
blessing, to have stayed connected this way.152 
These narratives provide a striking contrast to the rationale given by the 
New South Wales Minister for Community Services when she introduced a 
last-minute amendment to criminalise commercial surrogacy even when 
undertaken overseas. Burney argued that such arrangements, in addition to 
                                                           
149  Above note 147. 
150  This was also noted in another commercial arrangement: Dibben (2009a). 
151  Grant (2009). 
152  Nine Network (2007b), emphasis added. 
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being inherently exploitative of women and children, deprive children of 
access to information about their genetic and gestational heritage, and 
prevent any ability to form a relationship with the birth mother.153 The mis-
match between policy rationales with at least some of the reported 
experience underscores the missed opportunity of the various reform 
inquiries, all of which excluded any investigation into commercial 
surrogacy. I am not suggesting that the myriad social and legal issues 
presented by the international practice of commercial surrogacy are by any 
means easy to resolve, nor that reform models ought to uncritically adopt the 
perspective of intended parents. Nonetheless, commercial surrogacy presents 
legal problems of parentage and citizenship for Australian families which 
this round of reforms has deliberately failed to address.154  
Conclusion 
Australian laws on surrogacy have undertaken a dramatic volte-face in the 
space of just 25 years. Surrogacy has come in from the cold; it is no longer 
an inherently dangerous and exploitative enterprise threatening the stability 
and naturalness of family life. Instead, it has been reinscribed as a mode of 
family formation that, while unusual, is an unavoidable artefact of modern 
life, a legitimate last-resort cure for infertility that will be tolerated as long as 
it is done properly.  
The issue of surrogacy, despite touching only a small number of 
families to date, was considered to be an issue of great policy importance 
and personal significance in the parliamentary debates. At the same time, 
parliamentary debates – across no less than seven Australian jurisdictions – 
evinced very little knowledge of, and arguably even less interest in, the 
developing scholarly research into the experience of and outcomes from 
surrogacy. Instead, ideas about surrogacy were drawn largely (and not 
always accurately) from the media. Anecdote and personal narratives 
regarding both surrogacy and infertility waxed large in the dialogue across 
both sites. While this may not represent a particularly well-informed or 
evidence-based model of law reform, it does provide an illuminating site for 
analysis of the dynamic role of discourse and narrative in creating and 
justifying new legal regimes. 
Reform dialogues in both the media and parliamentary sites suggest that 
the legitimation of surrogacy has taken place as a result of changes to the 
social experience of fertility and family formation. While the discourse of 
‘nature’ and ‘cure’ continue to dominate, understandings of what comprises 
‘the natural’ appear to have shifted significantly. The desire to parent and to 
provide parental love was largely prioritised over the means of reproduction 
– thus third-party contributions such as donor gametes, pregnancy gestation 
                                                           
153  NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, p 27598 (Linda 
Burney). Extra-territorial prohibitions on commercial surrogacy are now in place in three 
states and territories, and have received largely critical media comment: for example, see 
Kwek (2011); Rowlands (2011a; 2011b). See also Stuhmcke (2012). 
154  Discussed in Millbank (2011). 
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and ART intervention across a variety of familial constellations could still be 
accommodated within a sense of ‘the natural’. Notably, the significance of 
heterosexuality in parenting remained hotly contested, and revealed that 
acceptance of surrogacy still pivots on a naturalised social experience of 
maternal desire: it is a cure for female infertility. The use of surrogacy by 
men without women – particularly gay men – was treated with suspicion and 
hostility across all of the debates, although gay men ultimately were 
excluded in only two of the legislative regimes. Likewise, the over-arching 
frame of genetic essentialism proved to be complex and contradictory. The 
significance of the parent–child genetic link was a major rationale for 
surrogacy in the sense that it minimised the role of the birth mother (‘100% 
our child’) but it also prompted great contention concerning genetic 
contribution by others, through genetic surrogacy and donor eggs. 
Discourses of genetic essentialism were also destabilised by a somewhat 
elastic notion of genetic ‘link’, encompassing familial relatedness more 
broadly rather than direct descent. Thus sisters, cousins and even mothers 
acting as surrogates were seen to maintain rather than fracture a genetic ‘tie’. 
The media and parliamentary sites notably diverged on the issue of 
payment to birth mothers. Parliamentary speakers resolutely opposed 
‘commercial surrogacy’. By contrast, accounts in the media continued to 
stress relationality even within the sphere of the surrogacy ‘marketplace’. 
Paid birth mothers were often characterised as part of a new kind of 
extended family, and the value and meaning of money was notably 
domesticated through discourses of home, education and bodily suffering in 
the media accounts. This schism between popular and parliamentary 
understandings of commercial surrogacy suggests further contest around the 
issue of criminalising this practice. It is to be hoped that any future reform 
processes will draw upon the developing body of international research on 
surrogacy in order to more accurately situate the personal experiences of 
surrogacy families within a broader evidence base. 
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